

A Runtime Verification Framework for Access Control

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1 Why runtime verification?

Runtime verification [2] is a formal verification technique that has recently become a tool of choice to complement other techniques such as model checking and unit testing. In a nutshell, we deploy a monitor M to dynamically monitor some system S while the latter is in operation (see Figure 1). Based upon a recent snapshot of the input and output of S , M decides whether or not S behaves according to its specifications. An alarm is raised if M happens to detect some behaviour that deviates from specifications.




Figure 1: System monitoring during operation.

Other formal verification techniques suffer one common limitation; namely, that they attempt to verify the correctness of a system based upon its formal specifications or a simplified version of the specifications. On the other hand, runtime verification attempts to remedy this defect by passively monitoring a system of interest S as it is running within its operating environment. For various systems, there are many advantages in using a passive monitor. Since S is being monitored for conformance to specifications during its operation, this increases our confidence in the implementation of S , in addition to the

confidence resulting from verifying the formal specifications. Verifying the correctness of the formal specifications of S shows us that in theory S behaves according to our conception of how it is to behave. However, in practice, certain information is only available during runtime. In some cases, the behaviours of S depend on its operating environment, so that S must not be considered as an entity separate from its environment. Furthermore, a crucial advantage of runtime verification is that the technique can be used to monitor critical systems, such as to ensure that a computer system grants access only to those with access privilege.

2 Automatic generation of monitors

The utility `ltl2mon` is a program for system supervision based on runtime verification. A description of a 3-valued semantics monitor of real-time properties is contained in [1]. The current project aims to realize this description by producing a working implementation in the form of the `ltl2mon` monitor. Listing 1 shows the usage information for `ltl2mon`. The utility translates a linear temporal logic (LTL) formula to a runtime verification monitor. This implementation uses the Java wrapper `LTL2BA4J` [5] by Eric Bodden to translate an LTL formula to the dot format representation of the corresponding Büchi automaton. Bodden's Java library is a wrapper around the tool `LTL2BA` [4] by Denis Oddoux and Paul Gastin. The dot format representation is then parsed as a directed graph using the `JGraphT` [3] library, followed by an emptiness check on the directed graph representation.

Figure 2 shows two screenshots of a sample execution of `ltl2mon` with input LTL formula aUb ; i.e. a until b . The left screenshot shows a trace that satisfies this formula; the right screenshot is an instance of a trace that violates the formula. At present, there is little support for a configuration file for `ltl2mon`. It is recommended that your configuration file, if one exists, be named “`ltl2monrc`”, although this is not a strict requirement. Each entry in your configuration file must follow the format:

```
# document your entry
<entryLabel>='<entryValue>'
```

where the hash symbol `#` is used for one-line comments.

```
1 Usage: java ltl2mon [-chis] [[-f formula] | [-F file]] [-o file]
2
3 c      : configuration file for ltl2mon
4 f formula : an LTL formula enclosed within quotation marks
5 F file   : reads an LTL formula from the specified file
6 h       : prints this help message
7 i       : output whether or not the initial state is empty
8 o file  : output dot format of Buchi automaton to the specified
9          file
10 s      : output the dot format of Buchi automaton to the terminal
11          screen. You can't use the s switch with the h or i switch
12
13 mandatory argument: exactly one of f or F must be present
```

Listing 1: Usage information for `ltl2mon`.

```

Terminal
~ $ cd temp/2008-01-30/
2008-01-30 $ ./demo.sh
Spec. Phi:  a U b

Monitoring a satisfying trace

Trace t:    [a]
t & Phi:    SAT
t & !Phi:   SAT
t |= Phi:   ?

Trace t:    [a, a]
t & Phi:    SAT
t & !Phi:   SAT
t |= Phi:   ?

Trace t:    [a, a, b]
t & Phi:    SAT
t & !Phi:   UNSAT
t |= Phi:   true

Terminal
Monitoring a violating trace

Trace t:    [a]
t & Phi:    SAT
t & !Phi:   SAT
t |= Phi:   ?

Trace t:    [a, a]
t & Phi:    SAT
t & !Phi:   SAT
t |= Phi:   ?

Trace t:    [a, a, !a]
t & Phi:    UNSAT
t & !Phi:   SAT
t |= Phi:   false

2008-01-30 $

```

Figure 2: Sample run of ltl2mon corresponding to LTL formula aUb .

References

- [1] Bauer, Andreas, Martin Leucker and Christian Schallhart. “Monitoring of Real-Time Properties” in S Arun-Kumar and N Garg (eds.). *FSTTCS 2006: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science* (LNCS 4337). Springer-Verlag, 2006, pp.260–272.
- [2] Colin, S and L Mariani. “Run-Time Verification”, chapter 18 in M Broy, B Jonsson, J-P Katoen, M Leucker and A Pretschner (eds.). *Model-based Testing of Reactive Systems*. LNCS 3472, Springer, 2005.
- [3] JGraphT - Java graph library
<http://jgrapht.sourceforge.net/>
 Viewed 29 January 2008
- [4] LTL2BA: fast translation from LTL formulae to Büchi automata
<http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/gastin/ltl2ba/>
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- [5] LTL2BA4J - Java bridge to ltl2ba
<http://www.sable.mcgill.ca/ebodde/rv//ltl2ba4j/>
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